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Abstract 
This paper provides the first empirical evidence on the macroeconomic effects of liquidity shocks 
in secondary sovereign debt markets. We consider the Italian case in a VAR analysis by applying 
different identification strategies: recursive ordering and Proxy-SVAR. Our findings suggest that 
liquidity is a major driver for indicators of economic activity. A shock to the Bid-Ask Spread induces 
a strong (15% of the Forecast Error Variance) and persistent (10 months) effect on unemployment 
and indicators of confidence. Liquidity shocks are transmitted to the real economy through 
changes in the lending behaviors of banks. On the one hand, an exogenous fall in liquidity induces 
a tightening of banks standards, particularly due to the asset and liquidity position of commercial 
banks. On the other hand, firms report worse credit conditions in terms of higher costs apart from 
the interest rate. Similar macroeconomic implications hold for Spain, whereas liquidity shocks are 
not a significant driver for France and Germany. 
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1 Introduction
The sovereign debt crisis has dramatically affected European countries since 2010. Southern
European countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIPS) have been facing increasing
unemployment rates and worsening credit conditions for governments, households and firms. Both
the media and economic researchers have focused on the behavior of spreads in yields and credit
default swaps (CDS), which are supposed to reflect default risk. However, sovereign bonds are very
demanded for their liquidity properties that have also fluctuated during the crisis.
In this paper, we examine liquidity, understood as the ease in releasing an asset quickly without
incurring in additional costs, as a different but complementary dimension of financial tensions.1
Government bonds are the most liquid assets in the economy, after money itself. European banks
hold large amounts of these assets in their portfolio due to their historical low default risk and
liquidity risk. Abrupt changes in the liquidity of sovereign bonds could affect the lending decisions
of banks.2
This is the first empirical investigation on the macroeconomic effects of exogenous changes in
liquidity in sovereign debt markets, which we call liquidity shocks. The Euro crisis constitutes an
ideal laboratory for such analysis because indicators of liquidity and default risk display different
patterns that can be used for identification. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the Bid-Ask Spread
(BAS), CDS and yield for Italy, which accounts for 26% of European sovereign debt, between
2004 and 2014.3 While during 2007-2011 the yield and BAS move in opposite directions, between
2011-2012 both of them increase. Moreover, the CDS displays a different dynamic with respect to
the other variables. Considering the fluctuations in Italian business cycle during this period, we
identify the effects and transmission channels of liquidity shocks. We base our analysis on Vector
Autoregression models (VAR) and our identification strategy relies both on the standard recursive
ordering and on the Proxy-SVAR. The latter uses exogenous changes in liquidity identified in a
financial daily VAR as an instrument for structural liquidity shocks.
Liquidity, as we show, has been a major driver for the Italian economy during the sovereign
debt crisis. The Forecast Error Variance (FEV) decomposition shows that liquidity shocks explain
a relevant share of the volatility of unemployment (15%) and confidence indicators like consumer
confidence, business confidence and stock prices. A BAS shock generates macroeconomic effects
that are at least as strong as the effects generated by a raise in yield spreads.4 The Bank Lending
Survey and the ISTAT Business Confidence Survey reveal that liquidity shocks affect the lending
1Notice that we refer to market liquidity, opposed to funding liquidity.
2We measure liquidity using the Bid-Ask Spread (BAS), the traditional indicator of liquidity. We also build an
alternative indicator which takes into account the volumes traded in secondary markets.
3European sovereign debt markets are concentrated with Italy and France accounting for roughly 50% of the total
public debt. Source: European Central Bank Statistics. Italy: 26.4%, France 22.7%, and Germany 18.3%. The three
variables are expressed as monthly averages.
4The joint contribution of BAS and yield spread shocks to the FEV of unemployment is 20% across 2004-2014
(15% + 5% respectively) and raises up to 30% aver 2009-2014 (15% + 15% respectively).
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behavior of banks due to problems in their asset and liquidity positions. Shocks to sovereign yield
spreads do not generate worse lending conditions through the same channels. Our findings are
particularly relevant to improve the understanding of the relationship between real economy and
financial markets.
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Figure 1: Italian (standardized) BAS, CDS and Yield (monthly average)
Each variable corresponds to the first principal components of 2, 5, 10 years bond maturities. Source: Bloomberg
(BAS) and Banca d’Italia.
Our empirical results can be interpreted using the theoretical framework developed by Cui and
Radde (2015). They build a real DSGE model with search and matching frictions in asset markets,
where the financial sector intermediates between buyers and sellers of financial assets. In this
framework, an exogenous increase in financial intermediation costs affects the market participation
of buyers more than the one of sellers and induces a fall in the liquidity of financial assets.
Market liquidity produces relevant implications for the real economy by tightening the financial
constraints of firms and reducing their financing possibilities.5 Cui and Radde (2015) mainly focus
on private assets since, in the U.S., sovereign bonds did not experience a fall in liquidity during
the crisis. On the contrary, as 1 displays, in the European (Italian) case, the liquidity of sovereign
5Notice that, contrary to the outstanding literature, they are able to generate the comovement between asset
turnover and asset prices.
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bonds has fluctuated significantly.6 Moreover, their setup can accommodate both market-based
and bank-based financial intermediation, with the latter characterizing European economies. Our
empirical findings and their theoretical results are consistent in terms of: fall in output, fall in
consumption and investment (proxied by business and consumer confidence indicators), turnover
(i.e. traded volume relative the outstanding amount of the asset), and asset prices. The only
(qualitative) difference consists in their responses being starker than our IRFs because they rely on
a model without nominal frictions. In a similar setup to Cui and Radde (2015), Cui (2016) studies
monetary and fiscal interactions with market liquidity, and draw conclusions on optimal policies by
considering government debt as provider of liquidity services.
Further works have also studied liquidity in a theoretical framework. Del Negro, Eggertsson,
Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2011) and Benigno and Nistico (2014) study the effects of shocks to an
exogenous liquidity constraint, which restricts the fraction of an asset which can be used to purchase
goods. While Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2011) impose this constraint on the
fraction of equity holdings that a household can resale, Benigno and Nistico (2014) restrict the
fraction of government bonds that can be exchanged for goods. Unlike Cui and Radde (2015),
these papers do not endogenize the dynamics of asset liquidity. Both papers conclude that liquidity
shocks (i.e a decrease in the release fraction of these assets) produce strong and negative effects
on GDP and prices, which in both cases are partially explained by a fall in private consumption.
These results differ from our empirical findings since we do not find that liquidity shocks induce
a significant effect on CPI inflation. Passadore and Xu (2014) investigate how liquidity risk and
credit risk explain sovereign spread through the optimal behavior of buyers and sellers. In an
endowment economy with incomplete markets and search and matching frictions in the sovereign
debt markets, they find that the liquidity component can explain up to 50% of sovereign spread
during the Argentinian crisis in 2001. Although the model matches the correlations and standard
deviations of consumption and net exports, they do not consider the effects on output. Overall,
we contribute to this literature by characterizing the empirical effects of liquidity shocks and by
identifying its transmission through the banking sector. In light of our empirical findings and of
the existing models, we believe that financial intermediation and search frictions are a key feature
to be taken into account when studying liquidity.
This paper is also related to the strand of the literature that analyzes the macroeconomic effects
of shocks to the spread in yields. Bahaj (2014) and Neri and Ropele (2015) study the macroeconomic
effects of yield shocks and find that they explain a relevant fraction of business cycle fluctuations in
European countries. However, they do not consider sovereign debt liquidity in their analysis and this
omitted dimension could affect their conclusions. Regarding the transmission channels, tensions in
sovereign debt markets induce a tightening in credit conditions through an increase in the funding
6Notice that we have also found similar macroeconomic results for the liquidity of corporate bonds and for the
spread in liquidity between corporate and sovereign bonds. Nonetheless, in all the specifications, shocks to the
liquidity of sovereign bonds produce relevant macroeconomic effects.
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costs of banks (De Marco (2016)) or through the Repo market (Boissel, Derrien, Ors, and Thesmar
(2014) and Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer (2014)). In this paper, we show that liquidity
shocks have strong macroeconomic effects and identify its transmission through the banking sector.
We find that liquidity is at least as relevant as spread in yields to explain fluctuations in economic
activity in Italy and Spain and that commercial banks respond to liquidity shocks in a different
way than to a yield shock.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the high frequency
variables that characterize Italian sovereign debt market. Section 3 presents the empirical specification
and results using different identification schemes. Section 4 investigates the transmission channels
by exploiting survey data. Section 5 compares the Italian results to France, Germany and Spain.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Data Description
Sovereign debt markets can be characterized by different indicators: Spread in Yields (Spread),
Credit Default Swaps (CDS), and Bid-Ask Spread (BAS). The first one captures the difference in
yields that a country has to pay in order to issue sovereign debt with respect to a safe asset, which
in this case is the German sovereign bond with the same maturity. CDS is a proxy for credit risk.
Finally, the third is a widely-used indicator of sovereign debt liquidity (see for example Pericoli and
Taboga (2015) and Pelizzon, Subrahmanyam, Tomio, and Umo (2015)).7 These variables enable
us to characterize the sovereign debt markets. For our analysis, we use data from Italy for the
period February 2004 until November 2014. The Italian sovereign debt market is one of the most
important in Europe, accounting for 26% of the European government debt.8 Before proceeding to
the analysis, we describe briefly the relationship between the three indicators. Table 2 displays the
daily correlation between these variables, both in levels and growth rates.9
Levels BAS Spread CDS
BAS 1 0.24*** 0.36***
Spread 0.24*** 1 0.91***
CDS 0.36*** 0.91*** 1
Growth Rates BAS Spread CDS
BAS 1 -0.03 -0.03
Spread -0.03 1 0.23
CDS -0.03 0.23*** 1
Table 1: Contemporaneous correlation between financial variables
Contemporaneous daily correlation between Italian financial variables at daily frequency: BAS, Spread, CDS. All
the variables correspond to 2 years maturity. Left-panel in levels, right-panel in growth rates. ***, **, * denote
99%, 95% and 90% confidence intervals.
7Alternatively, people also look at the volume traded or at a combination of both. Figure A1 in Appendix B
displays the evolution of the volume traded together with the BAS. We use the BAS for our empirical analysis and
present the results using the Liquidity Index, which incorporates both BAS and Turnover, in Appendix E.1.
8Source: European Central Bank Statistics.
9The daily correlations correspond to trading (business) days only.
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CDS is highly correlated (0.91) with the Spread while the BAS displays a relative low correlation
with the other two variables. This fact also holds if we consider the variables in daily growth
rates instead of in levels. In particular, the daily changes of the BAS are uncorrelated with the
other financial variables while CDS and Spread are positively correlated. From this preliminary
description, we can see that movements in Spread are more associated with credit risk (proxied by
the CDS) than liquidity risk, a similar finding to Pericoli and Taboga (2015).10 However, these
variables maybe correlated with other financial ones like stock prices, interest rates or the equity
implied volatility from options. Figure 2 displays the evolution of these financial variables at daily
frequency.11
Figure 2: Daily dynamics of the main financial variables
Financial variables: BAS Italy, Spread Italy, CDS Italy, FTSE MIB (main Italian Stock Price index), Vstoxx
(European Implied Volatiliy Index), Euro Overnight Index Average (Eonia). All variables are expressed in levels for
all the business days since September 2004 to November 2014. All variables but the Spread are expressed as an
index=100 at the beginning of the sample. Spread is computed as the difference between German and Italian yields
and expressed in basis points times 10.
The peaks in the VSTOXX index reflect the two main periods of financial stress: the second
part of 2008, associated with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and between the second half of 2011
10Notice that there is still no consesus in the finance literature. For example, Schwarz (2014) highlights, through
a novel measure of liquidity, that liquidity risk explains a large share of the raising yields during the Euro crisis.
Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2009) show that, during period of market stress, investors chase liquidity and not
credit quality.
11We use the European Volatility Index (VSTOXX) instead of the one based on FTSE MIB index because it is
available for the whole period and it is representative also for the Italian economy. Both indexes are highly correlated
for the period when they coincide.
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and 2012, related to problems in the European Sovereign Debt markets.12 These periods of stress
are reflected in a different way for each financial variable. On the one hand, the Italian stock price
index (FTSE MIB) falls with these two events and recover afterwards, without reaching the peak
of 2007. The response of the Eonia rate is similar and reflects the interest rate decisions of the
ECB and interbank market stress. On the other hand, financial variables associated with sovereign
debt markets display different dynamics. The BAS spikes in 2009 and exhibits an abrupt change
in volatility after January 14, 2011, when Fitch agency downgraded Greek sovereign debt to junk
status.13 The dynamics of CDS and Spread are similar during 2012, in line with the correlations
reported in Table 2, but the Spread declines at a lower pace after the spikes than the CDS. During
2014, we observe some spikes in the BAS whereas Spread and CDS decline steadily. The key point
for identification is that the six financial variables display different patterns.
Since in this paper we are going to focus on shocks to BAS, we analyze whether fluctuations
in this variable are associated with particular European events. This analysis enables to us to
understand better the underlying dynamics of this variable and its sources of variation. Figure 2
displays the dynamics of the BAS together with some key events related to the European Sovereign
debt crisis, which are reported in Table 1A included in the Appendix A.
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Figure 3: Daily BAS and key European events
Daily BAS Italy 2 Years (blue line) and key European events (red dots). Appendix A displays the list of all the
events.
First of all, as we mentioned before, the series displays a clear change in volatility after January
12In fact, the decline in the implied volatility happens after the famous speech of Mario Draghi, president of the
ECB, on July 26 2012.
13This fact holds for Spain only a few days later.
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14 2011. After that date, many events related to Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Italy are reflected
as spikes in this variable. Additionally, other European events coincide with BAS local maxima or
local minima. In particular, the BAS reached a minimum, comparable to pre-crisis levels, when
Mario Draghi stated the “Whatever it takes to save the Euro”. Liquidity in the Italian sovereign
debt market reflects important economic news, which is key for identification because many of those
events can be considered as exogenous with respect to the Italian economy.
3 Empirical Analysis
To analyze the effects of liquidity shocks we rely on different VAR specifications. In Section 3.1, we
estimate a small scale VAR used to identify the effects of liquidity shocks. Then, we use an enlarged
VAR for a better identification of the shocks and to characterize in higher detail the results and the
transmission mechanisms (Section 3.2). Both specifications rely on the Cholesky decomposition to
identify liquidity shocks. Given that imposing zero contemporaneous restrictions on some financial
variables can be controversial, in Section 3.3 we employ a more agnostic identification strategy, the
Proxy-SVAR, which places no restrictions on the timing or sign of the responses. Finally, in Section
3.4 we present extensions and additional exercises to further investigate liquidity and assess the
robustness of our findings.
3.1 Basic Specification
(In this section) As a first step, we estimate the effect of BAS shocks on Italian business cycles
using a small scale VAR. In particular, we specify a VAR that includes the Unemployment Rate,
as a proxy for economic activity; Consumer Price Inflation expressed as an annual rate, to capture
price dynamics; FTSE MIB, which is the main index of Stock Prices in Italy; Sovereign Spread ;
and BAS. While the first two variables are useful to capture the transmission to the real economy,
the last three are necessary to identify a liquidity shock. Our sample runs from February 2004
through November 2014. To deal with the different frequencies, we include the financial variables as
monthly averages in order to capture all the dynamics during the period.14 Following Sims, Stock,
and Watson (1990), we estimate the model in (log-)levels by OLS, without explicitly modeling
the possible cointegration relations among them.15 In addition to a constant, we also include a
deterministic trend. The lag order is selected following the three information criteria and it is
always one.16
We identify a liquidity shock using a standard Cholesky decomposition, which is based on
14Table C1 included in the Appendix contains a summary statistic of the main financial variables aggregated at
monthly frequency. All the variables are either seasonally adjusted or we adjust them using the Census X-13.
15Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990) show that if cointegration among the variables exists, the system’s dynamics can
be consistently estimated in a VAR in levels.
16We check that the residuals are normally distributed and they do not exhibit autocorrelation.
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recursive ordering. The variables are ordered in the VAR from the most exogenous to the most
endogenous ones, which are allowed to respond contemporaneously to all structural shocks. Thus,
we order Unemployment and Inflation, assuming that they cannot react to the shock on the same
month. A severe problem arises from the three financial variables that our VAR incorporates.
Obviously, they always react to all the available information and so there is no convincing way of
ordering them. Considering this issue, we take a more agnostic stance. Within the financial block,
we consider all the possible orderings and we report the median and percentiles of the impulse
responses and FEV. In this way, we identify 6 rotations and, for each of those, we compute 100
bootstrap replications. Figure 4 displays the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) to a one standard
deviation BAS shock (i.e. a decrease in liquidity). We report the median together with 68% and
90% confidence bands that include both the identification (from the different Cholesky orderings)
and statistical uncertainty.
Figure 4: IRF to a BAS shock
IRFs to a 1 std BAS shock (liquidity deterioration) identified through the following ordering [Unemployment, pi,
FTSE, Spread, BAS]. The median point estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are reported in blue and light
blue, respectively. 50%, 68% and 90% bands include statistical and identification uncertainty (from all the possible
ordering within the financial block).
An increase in the BAS induces an increase in Unemployment which lasts 10 months and a
slight decrease in CPI inflation. However, the remaining financial variables do not react to the
BAS shock. Similar results hold if we estimate the same VAR using the pre-2009 and the crisis
9
sample.17 Thus, shocks to the BAS have strong effects on economic activity. In order to understand
the channels behind this relationship and to see whether results are robust, in the next section we
consider a large scale VAR.
3.2 Full Specification
We aim at assessing the macroeconomic effects of BAS shocks, with special emphasis on the
comparison with other financial shocks. For this purpose, we enlarge the previous VAR system with
other variables. This system features six macroeconomic variables (Unemployment, CPI Inflation,
Public Debt, ECB Repo, Italian M218, Consumer and Business Confidence) plus five financial
indicators (stock prices, Spread, CDS, BAS and VSTOXX). This set of variables is necessary
to identify financial shocks and assess their transmission to the real economy.19 Like in Section
3.1, we identify the liquidity shock through recursive ordering. In particular, we assume that
macroeconomic variables cannot react contemporaneously to the financial shocks and we order them
as follows: [Unemployment, CPI, Public Debt, M2, Consumer Confidence, Business
Confidence].
Again, within the financial block, we consider all the possible orderings (120 rotations), compute
five bootstrap replications for each of them and report the median and percentiles of the impulse
responses and FEV. Different possible orderings across the financial block lead to very similar
results, which means that the covariance matrix of the reduce form residuals is close to a diagonal
matrix (i.e. the order of financial variables is not dramatically affecting our results).
Figure 3.2 displays the IRFs to a one standard deviation BAS shock, where 68% and 90%
confidence bands include both the identification (from the different Cholesky orderings) and statistical
uncertainty. The illiquidity shock induces an increase in unemployment that reaches its maximum
after four months without a significant effect on inflation, comparable to the findings of the VAR
presented in Section 3.1. The stock of government debt falls with a lag whereas there is no reaction in
the Repo rate and M2. Both business and consumer confidence indicators decline in response to the
shock and reach their trough four months after the shock. The response of confidence is strong across
all the specifications and could reflect a fall both in current and future consumption, which may
help to explain the strong response of unemployment (Ludvigson (2004)). Moreover, these dynamics
are consistent with the findings of Garcia and Gimeno (2014) for flight-to-liquidity episodes. The
Forecast Error Variance (FEV) contributions of BAS for consumer confidence, business confidence
and stock prices are respectively 15%, 9% and 7% one year after the shock. Moving to the financial
block, the equity premium, CDS and spread increase and the FTSE declines by 1%, all of them
with a lag. Responses of financial variables are in line expected movements: a decrease in the BAS,
which could be interpreted as an increase in the uncertainty regarding the value of the underlying
17For ease of exposition, we present these results in the Appendix.
18Same results hold employing Italian M3.
19As in Section 3.1, we estimate the VAR in (log) levels by OLS. The optimal number of lags is one.
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Figure 5: IRF to a BAS shock
IRFs to a 1 std deviation BAS shock (liquidity deterioration) identified through the following ordering
[Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The median point estimate, 68% and 90%
confidence bands are reported in blue and light blue, respectively. 50%, 68% and 90% bands include statistical and
identification uncertainty (from all the possible ordering within the financial block).
asset, reduces prices (i.e. increases the Yield), confidence, and stock prices and increases volatility
and CDS.
A key point in our analysis, in light of the outstanding literature on the Euro Crisis, consists
of the comparison between BAS (Figure 3.2) and Spread shocks (Figure 3.2). The Spread shock
induces a similar effect on unemployment slightly less persistent and significant. However, this
shock has a negative effect on CPI inflation, which declines by 0.04% points 2 months after the
shock. Even if the response of CPI inflation is different with respect to a BAS shock, in Section 3.3
we show that, by using the Proxy-SVAR, the IRF of CPI to a BAS shock is also negative.20 Notice
that this difference comes from the years 2004-2009 as we display in Figure A2.21 Unlike in the
previous case, consumer confidence and business confidence do not display a significant reaction.
Regarding the financial block, the responses are similar in magnitude (even if less significant) but
less lagged than the case of a BAS shock. An increase in Spread induces a delayed raise in BAS.
20As we show later on, CPI is the only variable whose dynamics changes across the two methodologies.
21The response of Spread is robust for the sub-sample 2009-2014.
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While the effects on unemployment are similar to the ones reported by Neri and Ropele (2015)
using a similar sample, the ones on inflation are the opposite from theirs. This could be explained
by the fact that we consider liquidity both for identification and transmission of the shock.
Figure 6: IRF to a Spread shock
IRFs to a 1 std deviation Spread shock identified through the following ordering [Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R,
M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The median point estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are reported in red and
light red, respectively. 50%, 68% and 90% bands include statistical and identification uncertainty (from all the
possible ordering within the financial block). Dotted line denotes the mean response to a 1 std deviation shock to
BAS.
For a more comprehensive comparison among financial shocks, in Figure 3.2 we report the FEV
decomposition of unemployment (i.e. how much each financial shock explains of unemployment’s
volatility). BAS shocks explain approximately 15% of unemployment fluctuations at two years
horizon. The second largest shock in relevance is the stock prices, accounting for 7%. The
remaining financial shocks do not explain a significant fraction of fluctuations in unemployment.
All in all, exogenous fluctuations in financial variables explain around 30% of the total variability of
unemployment. From this analysis, we can conclude that liquidity is a major driver of unemployment,
out of all the financial variables, for the period under analysis.22
22The relative contribution of each financial shock changes if we consider the sub-sample 2009-2014 (Figure A3 in
Appendix E). In this case, the contribution of spread is similar to the one of BAS, which is quantitatively stable over
the full sample.
12
Figure 7: FEV of Unemployment
FEV of Unemployment in the VAR [Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The bars
denote the contribution of each financial shock in explaining the volatility of Unemployment at each horizon
(expressed in months).
3.3 Proxy-SVAR
The results in previous section 3.2 are robust to the different Cholesky ordering. Still, in each
rotation, we are constraining (some) financial variables not to react on impact to other financial
shocks. In this section, we relax this assumption by applying the so called Proxy-SVAR identification
developed by Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2013). The main idea is to use
information external to the VAR system as a proxy for the structural shock of interest, the BAS
shock in our case. In practice, the proxy constitutes an instrument for the reduced form residuals of
the VAR and provides partial identification of the structural shocks. The instrument is assumed to
be correlated with the structural shock of interest but not with the remaining ones. An advantage
of this technique is that, as long as the proxy is a relevant and valid instrument, the identification
relies on a much weaker set of assumptions than the recursive identification scheme.23 In other
words, no assumptions are made on the contemporaneous relationship among the variables in the
system. Appendix D contains a detailed explanation of this methodology.
In order to obtain a valid instrument for BAS, we propose a new way to identify the proxy for
the Proxy-SVAR at high frequency. We label this identification “Bridge Proxy-SVAR” because the
Proxy-SVAR links two VAR systems that include data at different frequencies. In Gazzani and
23The proxy is not assumed to be perfectly correlated with the structural shock, but only to be a component of it.
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Vicondoa (2016b), we illustrate analytically the properties of Bridge Proxy-SVAR the and test it
via Monte Carlo simulations. The procedure consists of the following steps:
1. Construct two VARs systems. The first one is a VAR that incorporates daily financial
variables relevant for the analysis, defined High Frequency VAR (HF-VAR). This VAR features
[BAS,CDS, Y ield, FTSE,Eonia, V IX]. The second one is a VAR, defined Low Frequency
VAR (LF-VAR), that includes variables at monthly frequency. In particular, it is the same
system that we define in Section 3.2. Again, the financial variables in the LF-VAR are included
as monthly averages.
2. Estimate the HF-VAR and identify the structural shock of interest εBASHF with the most
appropriate identification scheme. Given that economic theory does not support any sign
restriction identification, we apply the recursive ordering Cholesky decomposition. Notice
that the biases implied by Cholesky in the HF-VAR are much lighter than in the LF-VAR.
Since we observe a structural break in the daily volatility of financial variables in 2009, we
estimate a VAR at daily frequency to identify structural innovations in the BAS during the
period 2009m1-2014m11 and we use them as an instrument for the structural BAS shocks at
monthly frequency.
3. Aggregate εBASHF into monthly frequency obtaining ε¯
BAS
HF .
4. Estimate the LF-VAR and apply the Proxy-SVAR identification, where ε¯BASHF is employed as
a proxy for the for the structural shock of interest in the LF-VAR εBASLF . Namely, the reduced
form residual uBASLF is instrumented with ε¯
BAS
HF . Again, the underlying assumptions concern
the relevance, corr
(
ε¯BASHF , ε
BAS
LF
) 6= 0 , and the validity, corr (ε¯BASHF , εjLF) = 0 ∀j 6= BAS ,
of the instrument.
This proxy explains a significant fraction of BAS reduced form residuals from the monthly VAR. The
statistics of the first stage are F-stat = 29.465 and R2 = 0.30231, which satisfies the requirements
of a strong instrument suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002). This means that a relevant fraction
of the reduced form residuals are explained by the daily shocks to the BAS.24 Figure 7 reports the
IRFs to an instrumented shock to the BAS. The BAS shock induces a significant and persistent
effect on unemployment, very similar both quantitatively and qualitatively to the ones described in
Section 3.2. Unlike with the recursive ordering, CPI inflation decreases by 0.02% after the shock.
As displayed in Figure A2, this difference is not due to the methodology but to the shorter sample
used. The remaining variables in the macroeconomic block display a comparable reaction to the
recursive ordering case. In particular, the BAS shock generates a strong response in the indicators
of confidence. All the financial variables display a significant lagged response, except for Equity
Premium that reacts on impact.
24Figure 8 in Appendix D includes a figure with the first stage results.
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Figure 8: IRF to a BAS shock
IRFs to a 1 standard deviation BAS shock (liquidity deterioration) in the VAR [Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R,
M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The shock is identified through the unpredictable variation of the BAS in a daily
VAR system. Sample: Jan:2009-Nov:2014. The median point estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are reported
in blue and light blue, respectively. Confidence bands are computed using wild bootstrap with 1,000 replications.
Dotted lines denote the mean responses of each variable to a 1 standard deviation BAS shock identified via
recursive ordering.
Even if the Proxy-SVAR relies on a weaker set of assumptions, we include it only as an alternative
because this approach just reaches partial identification. This implies that we cannot explicitly
compare liquidity and spread shocks. Nonetheless, the results from Proxy-SVAR confirm the
validity of the recursive ordering identification previously applied, that is the standard methodology.
Notice that, with the Proxy-SVAR, even without imposing any contemporaneous restriction, financial
variables do not display a significant response on impact (apart from the Equity Premium). However,
under this methodology, we can still compute the historical contribution of liquidity shocks to
unemployment, which help us to assess the relevance of these shocks during the recent crisis. In
fact, Figure 3.3 provides the historical interpretation of our results by displaying the component of
unemployment explained by the BAS. In the upper panel, unemployment is expressed in deviation
from the trend whereas, in the lower one, at the business cycle frequency.
The BAS explains the initial increase of unemployment, with respect to its trend, in 2010 and
2013 and also the reduction observed in 2014. Finally, it is also relevant to explain the increase
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Figure 9: Historical Contribution of BAS to Unemployment
Historical contribution of BAS to Unemployment. Identified in the VAR [Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R, M2,
CC, BC, Financial Block] through the unpredictable variation of the BAS in a daily VAR system. Upper panel -
Unemployment in deviation from trend. Lower panel - Unemployment at the business cycle frequency (18 to 96
months).
observed during the last stage of 2014. Similar conclusions hold if we look the contribution at
business cycle frequencies.
Our findings, which are robust across the two different identification strategies, suggest that
liquidity shocks have significant effects on unemployment. These results also hold if we consider
industrial production and the ITA-coin.25 A question that may arise naturally is why this peculiar
financial variable, not even on the focus of media’s attention, has so strong real effects. First, we
find that all the measures of confidence decline significantly in response to the decrease in liquidity.
This could point to a decrease in aggregate demand that explains the decrease in economic activity
(Ludvigson (2004)). Second, in Section 4, we show that commercial banks change their lending
conditions in response to liquidity shocks.
25Appendix E displays the IRFs using each indicator.
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3.4 Alternative VAR Specifications
Shocks to the BAS are a major driver of unemployment for the period under analysis. In this
subsection, we consider additional specifications to assess the validity of previous findings. For the
ease of exposition, the IRFs of the exercises performed in this section are presented in the Appendix
E.
3.4.1 Indicator of Liquidity
The BAS is one of the most popular indicators of liquidity. However, it captures only the price
dimension of liquidity while another relevant feature is the quantity side. A fall in liquidity equally
distributed across price and quatities would generate an increase in the BAS and a fall in the
quantity traded. In order to explore whether this relationship holds in our analysis, we estimate
the Full VAR including the Turnover, volume traded normalized by the stock of the outstanding
asset, as an additional variable in the system. While responses of macroeconomic variables to a
BAS shock remain unchanged, the turnover displays a significant reduction. This result conforms
with the theoretical predictions of the model proposed by Cui and Radde (2015).
In order to explicitly take this double dimension of liquidity into account, we compute a liquidity
index indicator that is defined as the ratio between the Turnover and the BAS.26 Thus, when the
liquidity index is higher (lower), the asset can be considered more (less) liquid. We estimate the
same baseline VAR but replacing the BAS with the Liquidity Index. Both responses of variables
in the system and the contribution of liquidity to explain fluctuations in unemployment remain
unchanged.
3.4.2 Measures of Economic Activity
All the results presented so far rely on Unemployment as a proxy for economic activity. Alternatively,
we estimate the VAR including Industrial Production and a Coincident Indicator of Economic
Activity (Indicatore Ciclico Coincidente (ITA-coin)), a monthly indicator of economic activity
published by the Bank of Italy.27 Results are comparable with the ones using Unemployment.
3.4.3 Different Samples
Figure 2 shows that financial variables display a change in volatility at daily frequency after 2009.
Moreover, in the same window there is also a stark fall in interest rates that can constitute another
source of structural break. To see whether this fact affects our findings, we estimate our baseline
VAR for the sub-sample 2009-2014. The main results remain unchanged. To tackle the possibility
26The correct measure would employ the quantity bid and asked, but unfortunately we cannot access this data.
Therefore, we use the actual number of trades (turnover on the secondary market) compiled by MTS.
27See https://www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/tematiche/indicatori/indicatore-ciclico-coincidente/
for more information about ITA-coin.
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that our results are driven only by the Euro crisis, we run the same analysis in 3.1 over the sample
2004-2009. Once again, we find very similar results in this short sample.
3.4.4 Corporate Liquidity
The finance literature that has reported sizable fluctuations of the market liquidity of corporate
bonds in the U.S during the financial crisis (see Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter, and Lando (2012)). Even
if Italian firms rely more on banks as a source of finance, we analyze the interrelation between
sovereign and corporate liquidity. For this aim, we use the BAS of a representative corporate bond
and include it in the VAR instead of the Equity Premium.28 A couple of interesting facts emerge.
First, the effects of sovereign BAS shocks remain unchanged. Second, an exogenous increase in the
private BAS generates a significant effect on Unemployment, which is comparable to the one induced
by the sovereign BAS. Finally, an exogenous change in the private BAS does not affect significantly
the sovereign BAS. These findings suggest that both BAS are relevant to explain economic activity.
Finally, we also consider the BAS as a spread between the corporate and sovereign. A shock to this
spread induces also sizable effects on economic activity.
3.4.5 Market Stress Index
As we show in Figure 2, the BAS reflects some relevant European events, which may be regarded
as periods of Market Stress. To assess potential omitted variable biases, we replace the Equity
Premium with the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (computed by the ECB) in our VAR.
IRFs are comparable with respect to the baseline specification. Thus, these results confirm that
our results are not biased by omitting other measures of stress in financial markets.
3.4.6 Financial Volatility
Financial variables display a time varying volatility at high frequency which is not reflected at
monthly frequency. To control for these changes, we compute the monthly volatility of BAS, CDS
and Spread using daily data. We build the first principal component that explains 78% of the
variability of these three measures. Then, we include this index in the VAR instead of the Equity
Premium. The IRFs and the FEV are unaffected. This suggests that previous findings are not
driven by changes in volatility.
28We use the BAS of a bond issue by Telecom (TELECOM ITALIA TITIM 5 3/8 01/19 ) which is the longest series
available. Moreover, it is highly correlated with the liquidity of the other bonds (e.g. 0,91 with Unicredit - UCGIM
4 3/8 01/20 and 0,65 with ENI - ENI INTERNATIONAL FINANCE ENIIM 5 1/27/19. Source: Bloomberg.
18
4 Transmission Channels
The easiness of trading sovereign bonds is particularly relevant for Italian banks because they hold
exceptional amounts of Italian sovereign debt. Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2014) show that
banks hold large amounts of public bonds due to their liquidity properties. The European Stress
Test carried out in 2010 provides some insights on the amount of these assets hold by the main
Italian commercial banks: Banca Popolare, Intesa San Paolo, Monte dei Paschi, UBI Banca and
Unicredit. Italian banks’ holding of national securities accounts for 74% of their total government
bond holdings. This share is even higher if we consider only the trading book: 84%.29 Moreover,
Italian sovereign bonds constitute 6.13% of the total assets owned by those five Italian banks
(Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2014)). In this Section, we assess whether and how changes in
sovereign debt liquidity and spread affect banks’ lending decisions using two official surveys. First,
we employ the ISTAT Business Confidence Survey, which is carried out at monthly frequency.
Second, we use the Bank Lending Survey from the Bank of Italy, which is available at quarterly
frequency. Unlike statistics about total amount of loans that include both demand and supply
effects, survey data allows us to disentangle more precisely the transmission channels.
4.1 ISTAT Business Confidence Survey
We employ data from the ISTAT Business Confidence Survey to assess the effects of liquidity and
spread shocks on firms’ credit conditions. This survey, which is carried out by ISTAT at a monthly
frequency since March 2008, covers a representative sample of 4,000 firms in the manufacturing
sector and includes information about firms’ assessments and expectations on the Italian economic
situation.30 To assess how changes in sovereign debt liquidity and spread affect the credit market, we
focus on questions regarding credit supply and demand and include them as an additional variable
in our baseline VAR.31 Given that the sample is shorter, we estimate the baseline VAR described
in section 3.2 since August 2009, when all the variables are available, including one variable at the
time to avoid loosing degrees of freedom. In particular, we assume that credit decisions cannot react
on impact to a financial shocks and place these credit variables before the consumer confidence,
business confidence and the financial block.32 Figure 10 displays the IRF to a liquidity deterioration
and a positive sovereign spread shocks.
Liquidity and sovereign spread shocks have different effects on the credit market. On the one
29For regulatory purposes, banks divide their activities into two main categories: banking and trading. The trading
book was devised to house market-related assets rather than traditional banking activities. Trading book assets are
supposed to be highly liquid and easy to trade.
30See http://siqual.istat.it/SIQual/visualizza.do?id=8888945&refresh=true&language=UK for a detailed
description of this survey. There is an analogous survey for the service sector but the sample is shorter. However,
results are similar to the ones reported in this section.
31The Data Appendix A contains the questions we consider from the ISTAT Business Confidence Survey.
32Results remain unchanged if we place this variable last in the VAR.
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Figure 10: Changes in credit market conditions for manufacturing firms
Note. Changes in the credit market for manufacturing firms in response to a one standard positive BAS (blue) and
sovereign spread (red) shocks. All figures denote change in the corresponding index reported by ISTAT. Blue and
red areas denote the 68% confidence intervals computed using bootstrap and include both identification and
statistical uncertainty.
hand, a BAS shock (i.e. a decrease of liquidity) does not change the index on perceived credit
conditions but induces worse conditions in terms of interest rate, size of the credit, and costs other
than the interest rate. Moreover, the BAS leads to an rise in the number of denied loans by banks
with a lag. On the other hand, a spread shock immediately reduces the credit access and increases
the number of denied loans by banks and a rise in the interest rate charged by banks. Notably, the
reason why credit is not obtained by firms (credit not obtained) is not related with firms rejecting the
loans offered by the banks (credit not obtained - too heavy conditions), but due to banks denying
the loan (credit not obtained - bank denial). In other words, credit supply is driving the lower
access to credit. While the spread shock affects mostly the interest rate and the size of the credit,
a liquidity shock also induces higher costs (apart from the interest rate). These higher costs reflect
higher commissions, extra-costs and tighter deadlines. For what concerns the timing, we observe a
more lagged response to a liquidity shock than to a spread one. This is consistent with the delayed
response of financial variables presented in Section 3.3.
After analyzing firm’s survey responses, in the next subsection we assess whether these results
are consistent with bank’s replies. Additionally, we investigate the reasons that drive banks
behavior.
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4.2 Bank Lending Survey
We exploit the Bank Lending Survey (BLS) on Italian commercial banks to determine the effects
of liquidity and spread shocks. This survey, which is carried out by Banca d’Italia in collaboration
with the European Central Bank at quarterly frequency since January 2003, contains very detailed
information about bank’s decisions on different dimensions.33 Unlike in the previous subsection, we
cannot include the replies to the survey in the baseline VAR due to the differences in frequencies.
For this reason, we aggregate the monthly BAS and spread shocks identified in section 3.2 to
quarterly frequency and estimate the following equation:
∆BLSit = α+
8∑
j=1
δj∆BLS
i
t−j +
12∑
j=0
βjshock
k
t−j (1)
where ∆BLSit , shock
k
t denote the change in bank’s behavior and quarterly BAS and spread
shocks, respectively. We follow Romer and Romer (2004) and choose eight lags for the autoregressive
part and twelve for the effect of the shock. Then, we compute the IRF to a BAS and spread shock
for the main bank decisions available in the Survey (Figure 4.2).34
Banks increase their credit standards to firms in response to liquidity and spread shocks with
a similar magnitude. However, the reasons for increasing standards differ. On the one hand, in
response to a illiquidity shock, banks react due to issues with their own asset and liquidity position.
On the other hand, banks do not report changes in the relevance of the asset and liquidity position
in response to a spread shock. These differences in behavior suggest that banks increase their focus
on their own balance sheet in case of a liquidity deterioration in sovereign debt markets. Moreover,
banks adjust immediately their standards for mortgage loans while they do not change it for the
case of spread shocks. Mortgages are collateralized loans and, in case of no repayment and liquidity
problems, banks may not find it easy to release the house and that may explain why they increase
their standards. Finally, both shocks are associated with an increase of similar magnitude in the
perception of risk about economic activity.
With the evidence presented in Sections 3 and 4, we conclude that liquidity shocks have relevant
real effects on the Italian economy and we document that transmission is through changes in the
credit supply. In the next section, we analyze whether liquidity shocks are also relevant for the
other three major Eurozone economies: Germany, France, and Spain.
5 Comparison with other European Countries
In order to assess whether liquidity shocks are also relevant drivers of the business cycle in other
European economies, we perform the previous analysis also for Germany, France, and Spain. First,
33More information about this survey can be found at BLS .
34The Data Appendix contains the detailed questions we consider from the Bank and Lending Survey.
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Figure 11: Change in banks lending decisions
Change in banks decisions in response to a positive shock in BAS and Spread. All the figures denote the change in
the corresponding index as reported in the BLS. Blue and red areas denote the 90% confidence intervals computed
using 500 bootstrap replications.
in Table 5 we analyze if sovereign BAS are correlated across countries, which would indicate to
what extent they are explained by common shocks. We observe that BASs are positively correlated
across the biggest four Eurozone economies. While BAS for Germany seems to be less correlated
with the rest of the countries, the correlation is stronger between France, Italy and Spain.
Italy Spain France Germany
Italy 1 0.49*** 0.56*** 0.24***
Spain 0.49*** 1 0.69*** 0.32***
France 0.56*** 0.69*** 1 0.42***
Germany 0.24*** 0.32*** 0.42*** 1
Table 2: Daily correlation of European BAS
Daily correlations of 2 year sovereign BAS across countries (source: Bloomberg).
Second, we estimate the baseline VAR described in Section 3.2 for each country to determine
whether the macroeconomic results for Italy also hold for the other countries.35 A first relevant
finding is that the identified BAS shocks are positively correlated across countries: the correlation
ranges from 0.3, France-Germany, to 0.21, France-Italy.36 Both the correlation of the variables in
35The sample is February 2004-November 2014 for Germany, Italy and Spain. Due to the lack of CDS data before
2005, the sample for France starts in August 2005. All financial variables are expressed as monthly averages.
36In particular, the estimated cross-country correlations are statistically significant for all the cases but between
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levels and of the shocks indicate that liquidity in sovereign markets is driven by a relevant European
component.
Figure 12: FEVD of Unemployment for European countries
Fevd of Unemployment for Italy, France, Germany, and Spain. The FEVD is computed estimating a VAR for each
country that includes: [Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. BAS shocks are
identified from all the possible rotations across the financial variables.
We present the macroeconomic relevance of the financial shocks, across the four countries, in
Figure 11 through the Forecast Error Decomposition of unemployment. There is clear heterogeneity
between the Mediterranean countries and the central European ones. On the one hand, changes
in BAS are an important driver of unemployment for Spain and Italy. For both cases, BAS shocks
account for 15% of unemployment fluctuations.37 A special feature of Spain is the relevance of CDS,
which might be due to the perceived higher default risk. On the other hand, exogenous fluctuations
in stock markets are the most relevant source of unemployment fluctuations for Germany and
France. In fact, neither BAS nor sovereign spread seem to be relevant to explain unemployment
fluctuations in these countries. Even if financial shocks explain a similar fraction of the total
variability of unemployment (around 30%), the relevance of each financial shock differs across
countries. Although the sources of this difference are beyond the scope of this paper, one possible
reason could be the lower tensions in sovereign debt markets in France and Germany.
France and Spain.
37Moreover, the IRF to a BAS shock has similar effects both in terms of magnitude and persistence.
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6 Conclusions
Economists have been focusing on sovereign debt markets due the European Sovereign Debt Crisis.
Contrary to the growing number of theoretical models that analyze changes in liquidity in those
markets, the empirical evidence on their real effects is still null. In this paper, we provide the
first empirical evidence on the macroeconomic effects of changes in liquidity in secondary sovereign
debt markets. We focus on the European economies that were hit both by credit risk and liquidity
shocks during the recent crisis. In particular, we consider the Italian case by using monthly data
from 2004 to 2014 in a VAR analysis. The two alternative identification strategy that we employ,
recursive ordering and the Proxy-SVAR, yields consistent results. The former takes into account
all the possible orderings among financial variables. The Proxy-SVAR exploits a daily financial
VAR to control for all high-frequency changes in financial markets. Specifically, we use daily BAS
structural shocks as proxy for the monthly BAS structural shocks. We find that, contrary to popular
perceptions, liquidity is a major financial driver of economic activity. An exogenous raise in this
variable generates a strong (15% of the Forecast Error Variance) and persistent (10 months) surge
in unemployment. The other variables that are mostly affected are confidence indicators as Stock
Prices, and Consumer and Business Sentiment. Banks and firms survey data reveal that liquidity
shocks have significant effects on banks standard, in terms of loan’s size and through ancillary costs,
particularly due to the asset and liquidity position of Italian banks. Similar macroeconomic effects
hold for Spain, whereas liquidity shocks are not a significant driver for France and Germany.
Our results differ from existing models, as Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2011)
and Benigno and Nistico (2014), where liquidity shocks induce a pronounced deflation. Therefore,
in particular in the light of our findings related to the banking channel, we believe that models that
focus on the asset and liquidity position of financial intermediaries can enhance our understanding
of these phenomena. We regard Cui and Radde (2015) as a first step towards this interesting
direction for future research. Frameworks of this kind, which can generate macroeconomic effects
consistent with the empirical evidence, can be used to assess whether and how policy makers should
react to changes in liquidity (Cui (2016)). They mainly focus on the liquidity of corporate bonds
as their reference is the US economy. Instead, by studying European economies we conclude that
the liquidity of sovereign bonds is a key financial dimension for the macroeconomy. The liquidity
of these two different assets may involve diverse policy implications.
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A Appendix. Data
Table A1 displays the data sources for each country.
Italy Spain
Unemployment ISTAT Ministry of Economy
Industrial Production ISTAT INE
CPI Inflation ISTAT INE
Central Government Debt Bank of Italy Ministry of Economy
ECB Repo ECB ECB
M2 Bank of Italy Banco de Espan˜a
Consumer Confidence ISTAT Ministry of Economy
Business Confidence ISTAT Ministry of Industry
Volatility Index ASR-Absolute Strategy VSTOXX
CDS Thomson Reuters CDS Thomson Reuters CDS
Bid-Ask Spread Bloomberg Bloomberg
Yield Spread ECB ECB
Stock Prices FTSE MIB IBEX 35
France Germany
Unemployment INSEE OECD
Industrial Production INSEE Federal Statistical Office
CPI Inflation Thomson Reuters Thomson Reuters
Central Government Debt Banque de France Deutsche Bundesbank
ECB Repo ECB ECB
M2 Banque de France Deutsche Bundesbank
Consumer Confidence DG ECFIN DG ECFIN
Business Confidence DG ECFIN DG ECFIN
Volatility Index Euronext Paris Deutsche Boerse
CDS Thomson Reuters CDS Thomson Reuters CDS
Bid-Ask Spread Bloomberg Bloomberg
Yield Spread ECB ECB
Stock Prices CAC 40 MDAX Frankfurt
Table A1: Data Sources
All the variables are seasonally adjusted originally or by using the X-13ARIMA procedure. We
deflate nominal variables by the corresponding CPI price index in order to estimate the VAR with
real variables.
In Section 4.2, we refer to the following questions from the Bank and Lending Survey:
1. Firm ∆ Standards: Changes in bank’s credit standards for approving loans or credit lines to
enterprises, Overall (all firms and types of loans), Past three months.
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2. Firm: Costs-Asset Position: Changes in the contribution of cost of funds and balance sheet
constraints (costs related to bank’s capital position) affecting credit standards for approving
loans or credit lines to enterprises.
3. Firm: Liquidity Position: Changes in the contribution of cost of funds and balance sheet
constraints (bank’s liquidity position) affecting credit standards for approving loans or credit
lines to enterprises.
4. Firm: Risk-Economic Activity: Changes in the contribution of perception of risk about
general economic situation and outlook affecting credit standards for approving loans or credit
lines to enterprises.
5. Mortgages: ∆ Standards: Changes in credit standards for approving loans to households,
loans for house purchase in the last three months.
6. Mortgages: Costs-Funding: Changes in the contribution of the following factors affecting
credit standards for approving loans to households for house purchase, cost of funds and
balance sheet constraints.
For what concerns the ISTAT survey, the questionnaire can be found at ISTAT questionnaire (only
in Italian). We refer to the following questions/answers:
43 Today, in our opinion, are the credit conditions more or less favorable compared to three months
ago? (Possible answers: More; Constant; Less)
45 Have you obtained the loan you requested to the bank or financial institution? (Possible answers:
Yes, at the same conditions; Yes, at worse conditions; No; Only asking information)
46 In case answer to 43 was No - Has the bank reject your request or you have not accepted their
offer due to the conditions they were setting? (Possible answers: The bank has not offered a
loan; We have not accepted the loan due to not favorable conditions)
47 In case answer to 45 was Yes, at worse conditions - Why the conditions have become worse?
(Possible answers: Higher rate; More personal collateral requested; More real collateral requested;
Limits on the amount of the loan; Additional costs)
B Appendix. High Frequency Variables
We report the main events plotted in Figure 2, the evolution of volume traded and BAS to
characterize the dynamics of liquidity in sovereign debt markets, and the dynamic correlations
between the BAS and the Spread in Yields.
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Date Events
2/7/07 HSBC issue with subprimes
6/7/07 Bearn Sterns first bad news
8/9/07 BNP Paribas
9/13/07 Northern Rock
2/18/08 Northern Rock Nationalized
3/14/08 Bearn Sterns bought by JP Morgan
9/15/08 Lehman
10/16/08 Greek Deficit Surprise
5/7/10 EFSF
7/23/10 Stress Test
10/28/10 ESM
5/17/11 Portugal asks help
8/5/11 Letter to Mr. Berlusconi from ECB
8/16/11 ECB buys after Ita take measures
10/4/11 Downgrade ITA-SPAIN
10/11/11 CDS-ban announced
10/31/11 Draghi takes over
11/1/11 CDS-ban in place
11/14/11 Mr. Monti takes over
12/5/11 Mr. Monti package
12/8/11 LTRO announced
12/21/11 1st LRTO
2/28/12 LTRO announced
6/26/12 Cyprus requests aid
7/26/12 Mr. Draghi whatever it takes
8/2/12 OMT announced
12/10/12 Monti resigns
12/13/12 SSM announced
11/7/13 ECB cuts Rate
Table A2: List of European and Italian specific events.
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Figure A1: Italian BAS and Turnover on the MTS platform.
Figure A2: Dynamic Correlations among Spread, CDS and BAS (2004-2014). Correlations are computed over a 90
days rolling window.
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C Appendix. Financial Variables at Monthly Frequency
Table A3 summarizes statistics of the financial variables used in the empirical analysis at monthly
frequency:
Full Sample 2009-2014
BAS Yield CDS BAS Yield CDS
Mean 0.017 4.318 98.278 0.020 4.41 169.58
Max 0.037 7.057 546.159 0.037 7.057 546.159
Min 0.007 1.990 2.343 0.007 1.990 36.352
St. Dev. 0.007 0.809 124.411 0.007 1.008 128.619
Auto Corr. 0.836 0.956 0.964 0.782 0.957 0.940
TABLE A3: Descriptive statistics of sovereign debt financial variables at monthly frequency. Sources: Bloomberg,
Datastream and Bank of Italy. Maturities: BAS and CDS 2Y and Yield 10Y.
There is no significant change in volatility and standard deviation in the period of the sovereign
debt crisis at monthly frequency.
D Appendix. Proxy-SVAR
We describe the the Proxy SVAR methodology that we use to identify the effects of BAS shocks
and the first stage results (i.e. the linear projection of the reduced form residuals on the exogenous
variations of BAS identified at daily frequency).
D.1 Theoretical Reference
Consider the following VAR:
Yt = AYt−1 + ut (2)
with Yt a vector of endogenous variables and ut is a vector of reduced form residuals with
variance-covariance matrix Σu. The objective is to recover the structural form of the VAR,
characterized by the vector of structural shocks εt = B
−1ut:
Yt = AYt−1 +Bεt (3)
We can rewrite the VAR system as partitioned (or bivariate for a matter of interpretation):
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[
Bast
Xt
]
=
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
][
Bast−1
Xt−1
]
+
[
B11 B12
B21 B22
][
εbast
εXt
]
(4)
The Proxy-SVAR is an identification strategy that (potentially) partially identifies the unknown
B matrix. Namely, we aim at identifying only the block
[
B11
B21
]
, which would allows us to compute
the IRFs of the system to a structural innovation in the BAS. In order to reach the identification,
we exploit information from outside the VAR system. We use the variable zt as a proxy for the
true structural shock εbast . zt is assumed to be a proxy for (a component of) the true ε
bas
t with the
following (instrumental variable) properties:
E
[
εbast zt
]
6= 0
E
[
εXt zt
]
= 0
In fact, under those assumptions, we can obtain consistent estimates of
[
B11
B21
]
by taking an
instrumental variable approach:
First Stage: regress ubast = βzt + ξt obtaining uˆ
bas
t
Second Stage: uXt =
B21
B11
uˆbast + ζt
Given that the BAS reacts one to one to its own structural shock (on impact), we can normalize
B21
B11
= B21. The IRFs to a BAS shock can be then computed across different horizons as:
IRFX0 = B21
IRFXn = An−1IRFXn−1 ∀n > 0
D.2 First Stage
Figure A4 displays the RF residuals predicted by the proxy, compared to the original RF innovation
series.
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Figure A4: First stage result: the blue line represents the RF residuals of the BAS from the VAR featuring
[Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]; the red bar is the RF residuals predicted by the
Proxy (BAS shocks identified in a daily VAR including [BAS,CDS, Y ield, FTSE,Eonia, V IX])
E Appendix. Alternative VAR Specifications
We present the results from alternative VAR specifications described in Section 3.4. To keep the
appendix short, we only report results using some particular identification schemes (Basic, Full or
Proxy SVAR). Results are robust using the other identification schemes and are available from the
authors upon request.
E.1 Indicator of Liquidity
Figures A5-A6 report the IRFs to a BAS shock of the Full VAR and Proxy-SVAR specifications
including the Turnover instead of the Equity Premium, respectively. Figure A7-A8 display the IRFs
to a liquidity shock and the FEVD of Unemployment from the Full VAR including the Liquidity
Index instead of the BAS. An increase (decrease) in the Liquidity Index is analogous to a decrease
(increase) in the BAS.
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Figure A5: IRFs to a 1 std BAS shock identified through the following ordering [Unemployment, pi, Public Debt,
R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The turnover of Italian sovereign bonds is included in place of the equity
premium. The median point estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are reported in cyan, blue, and light blue,
respectively. 50%, 68% and 90% bands include statistical and identification uncertainty (from all the possible
ordering within the financial block).
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Figure A6: IRFs to a 1 standard deviation BAS shock (liquidity deterioration) in the VAR [IP, pi, Public Debt, R,
M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The turnover of Italian sovereign bonds is included in place of the equity premium.
The shock is identified through the unpredictable variation of the BAS in a daily VAR system. Sample:
Jan:2009-Nov:2014. The median point estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are reported in blue and light blue,
respectively. Confidence bands are computed using wild bootstrap with 1,000 replications.
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Figure A7: IRFs to a 1 std Liquidity Index shock (liquidity improvement) identified through the following ordering
[Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The median point estimate, 68% and 90%
confidence bands are reported in cyan, blue, and light blue, respectively. 50%, 68% and 90% bands include
statistical and identification uncertainty (from all the possible ordering within the financial block).
Responses are similar to the ones displayed in Section 3.2 of the paper. Figure A8 displays the
Forecast Error Variance of Unemployment.
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Figure A8: FEV of Unemployment including the Liquidity Index identified through the following ordering
[Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block].
Liquidity accounts for around 20% of Unemployment fluctuations in the period under analysis,
in line with results presented in Section 3.2.
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E.2 Measures of Economic Activity
In this case, we use alternative measures of economic activity and present the corresponding IRFs.
We include results both with our small VAR system and with the Proxy-SVAR. In Figure A9-A11,
we employ Industrial Production while in Figure A10-A12 the ITA-Coin.
Figure A9: IRFs to a 1 std Liquidity Index shock (liquidity improvement) identified through the following ordering
[Industrial Production, pi, FTSE, Spread, BAS]. The median point estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are
reported in cyan, blue, and light blue, respectively. 50%, 68% and 90% bands include statistical and identification
uncertainty (from all the possible ordering within the financial block).
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Figure A10: IRFs to a 1 std Liquidity Index shock (liquidity improvement) identified through the following
ordering [Itacoin, pi, FTSE, Spread, BAS]. The median point estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are reported
in cyan, blue, and light blue, respectively. 50%, 68% and
90% bands include statistical and identification uncertainty (from all the possible ordering within the financial block).
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Figure A11: IRFs to a 1 standard deviation BAS shock (liquidity deterioration) in the VAR [IP, pi, Public Debt, R,
M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The shock is identified through the unpredictable variation of the BAS in a daily
VAR system. Sample: Jan:2009-Nov:2014. The median point estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are reported
in blue and light blue, respectively. Confidence bands are computed using wild bootstrap with 1,000 replications.
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Figure A12: IRFs to a 1 standard deviation BAS shock (liquidity deterioration) in the VAR [IP, pi, Public Debt, R,
M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The shock is identified through the unpredictable variation of the BAS in a daily
VAR system. Sample: Jan:2009-Nov:2014. The median point estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are reported
in blue and light blue, respectively. Confidence bands are computed using wild bootstrap with 1,000 replications.
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E.3 Alternative Samples
We study the dependence of our findings on the sample used. Figures A13-A14 display the IRFs to
a BAS shock and FEV of Unemployment using the sample January 2009-November 2014. Figure
A15 displays the IRF of the Basic VAR using the pre-crisis sample (February 2004-December 2008).
The main conclusions remain unchanged.
Figure A13: IRFs to a 1 std BAS shock identified through the following ordering [Unemployment, pi, Public Debt,
R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The median point estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are reported in cyan,
blue, and light blue, respectively. 50%, 68% and 90% bands include statistical and identification uncertainty (from
all the possible ordering within the financial block).
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Figure A14: FEV of Unemployment including the Liquidity Index identified through the following ordering
[Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block].
Figure A15: IRFs to a 1 std Liquidity Index shock (liquidity improvement) identified through the following
ordering [Unemployment, pi, FTSE, Spread, BAS]. The median point estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are
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reported in cyan, blue, and light blue, respectively. 50%, 68% and 90% bands include statistical and identification
uncertainty (from all the possible ordering within the financial block).
E.4 Corporate Liquidity
In this section, we consider the relationship between the Corporate and Sovereign liquidity. Figure
A16 displays the evolution of the Corporate BAS together with sovereign variables aggregated at
monthly frequency. Figure A17 displays the IRF to a shock to corporate BAS and compares it
to the one to a sovereign BAS. Finally, Figure A18 shows the IRFs using as a variable the spread
between Corporate and Sovereign BAS instead of the BAS.
Levels BAS-S Spread CDS BAS-C
BAS-S 1 -0.08 0.39* 0.31*
Spread -0.08 1 0.35 0.5*
CDS 0.39* 0.35 1 0.9*
BAS-C 0.31* 0.5* 0.9* 1
Table 3: Sovereign and Corporate Liquidity
Correlation over the 2004-2014 among Sovereign and Corporate BAS, Spread and CDS (as monthly averages).
Figure A16: Comparison among Sovereign and Corporate BAS, Spread and CDS (as monthly averages). Source of
Corporate BAS: Bloomberg.
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Figure A17: IRFs to a 1 std Corporate BAS shock (compared to a sovereign BAS shock in blue) identified through
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the following ordering [Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The median point
estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are reported in cyan, blue, and light blue, respectively. 50%, 68% and 90%
bands include statistical and identification uncertainty (from all the possible ordering within the financial block).
Figure A18: IRFs to a 1 std (Corporate-Sovereign) BAS shock identified through the following ordering
[Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The median point estimate, 68% and 90%
confidence bands are reported in cyan, blue, and light blue, respectively. 50%, 68% and 90% bands include
statistical and identification uncertainty (from all the possible ordering within the financial block).
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E.5 Market Stress Index
Figure A19 displays the IRFs to a BAS shock of the enlarged VAR that includes the Composite
Indicator of Systemic Stress, computed by the ECB.
Figure A19: IRFs to a 1 std BAS shock identified through the following ordering [Unemployment, pi, Public Debt,
R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The CISS Index is included in place of the the equity premium. The median point
estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are reported in cyan, blue, and light blue, respectively. 50%, 68% and 90%
bands include statistical and identification uncertainty (from all the possible ordering within the financial block).
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E.6 Financial Volatility
Figure A20 displays the IRFs to a BAS shock of the enlarged VAR that includes an indicator that
account for volatility in sovereign debt markets. This indicator is defined as the first principal
component of the realized montly volatility of sovereign BAS, Spread and CDS, computed using
daily data.
Figure A20: IRFs to a 1 std BAS shock identified through the following ordering [Unemployment, pi, Public Debt,
R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. A principal component that summarizes the volatility of financial variables is
included in place of the equity premium. The median point estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are reported
in cyan, blue, and light blue, respectively. 50%, 68% and 90% bands include statistical and identification
uncertainty (from all the possible ordering within the financial block).
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